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A Whiteheadian Innervation of the Soma: A New
Vision for the Peripheral Nervous System
David Milliern1
California Institute of Integral Studies
Abstract: This essay draws attention to two problems in neuroscience’s set of
assumptions. These self-defeating assumptions include: 1) the assumption that what the
nervous system, especially the brain, does is synthesize experience, while also assuming
philosophical realism, and 2) the problem of biological signal transduction. In the latter,
neuroscientists and philosophers of biology have left unaddressed the issue that the signal
differences between the inside and outside of the organismic boundary are of distinct
ontological types; and yet no concern has been expressed regarding how it is possible that
an organism’s inner states could reflect the experiential content flowing from outside of
the organism’s boundary. To resolve this problem, I propose that the process philosophy
of Whitehead be implemented to adjust our understanding of what body is and how the
peripheral nervous system draws in experience through the senses. Some discussion will
surround the enteric nervous system, regarding the evolutionary past of organisms, the
thought that enteric nervous system probably played the role of the brain in our
evolutionary ancestors, and how Whitehead’s philosophy of organism can help bring
some understanding to this anti-Cartesian idea.
Keywords: Whitehead, nervous system, process philosophy, cognition, neuroscience,
metaphysics, panpsychism, panexperientialism

In the theory and philosophy extending from
the time of Galen, the supremacy of the brain
as seat of cognition and consciousness has
been on the rise. Perhaps the final anointing
of this supremacy came when Descartes
(1641/2017, p. 18) introduced res cogitans,
and then put it in strict localized interaction
with the brain. The centrality of the brain’s
role in consciousness and cognition appears
almost fixed in the times of modern
neuroscience and cognitive studies. Some
challenges to the centrality of goings-on in
the cranium have arisen, but there has yet to
be head-on challenge presenting a framework
that seeks to substantially contradict the
contemporary commonsense assumption,
1

namely, as far as consciousness and cognitive
activity is concerned it is all in the head.
The following article begins with an
illustration that the central philosophical
tenets of the mechano-reductionistic
theoretical framework of brain and cognitive
sciences are grounded in contradictions. I
will proceed from there, explaining how
considerably more sense and consistency can
be
brought
to
understanding
the
consciousness as processes, though in
radically different terms than those of the
analytically-minded approach to brain
science. The cost of this consistency comes
with the humility of accepting limitations to
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the interpretation of contemporary science,
and this cost may be termed “mystery.” The
admission of this mystery comes by way of
implementing
the
ontological
and
metaphysical framework of Alfred North
Whitehead to the peripheral nervous system
(PNS), which forces us to remove emphases
on the centrality of the brain by lifting the
tyranny of the eye. By the end of this article,
the previous clause will be made clear, as we
dispose of the erroneous presupposition that
the realm of visual contents necessarily and
exhaustively catalogs all that is.
Motivation
There are two distinct arguments that arise
out of assumptions made by contemporary
sciences of the brain and cognition, which, in
themselves, seem to destroy the entire
interpretive framework of theoretical science.
I will call these: (a) the argument from
hallucination; (b) the argument from cellular
signal transduction. In addition to these two
arguments this article will find its motivation
in a discussion regarding the death of
mechanistic philosophy, which has almost
entirely gone under the radar possibly
because of scientists and analytic
philosophers continuing their post-wake
mornings hundreds of years later.
It doesn’t seem to have clicked for most
scientists and contemporary philosophers
that the aspect of synthesis within the
framework of modern understandings of
what the brain does falls victim to a
congenital illness. This congenital illness is
that which has been inherited from Kant’s
transcendental
idealism.
First,
an
examination
of
the
contemporary
neuroscientific perspective will assist in
establishing the prevailing mindset, and then
the connection to Kant’s synthetic approach
will appear more readily. I have chosen Anil
Seth,
professor
of
Cognitive
and

Computational
Neuroscience
at
the
University of Sussex, to represent the popular
interpretation of what the brain is and does.
In an interview, he characterized the popular
view as follows: “In the story I'm going to tell
you, our conscious experiences of the world
around us, and of ourselves within it, are
kinds of controlled hallucinations that happen
with, through and because of our living
bodies” (Seth and Raz, 2018) Any kind of
inner synthesis of experience is going to beg
the question, inquiring into the nature of that
experience’s connection to what is external.
As soon as one commits to this manner of
thinking, there is an immediate schism to the
generation of “inner states” and whatever
might be objectively external to that state.
Kant’s transcendental framework admits no
discernible way to connect the noumenal
realm to the phenomenal realm with explicit
detail, except to stipulate that the ground
phenomenal experience is grounded in
things-in-themselves that make up the
noumenal realm (Stang, 2016). Detailing
Kant’s framework, where passively given
raw data of experience have categories
imposed upon the collective sense content
through the imagination in time and resulting
in a transcendental unity of apperception,
leaves one open to whether there is any need
for an external ground to the “resultant”
objects of perception (Rosenberg, 2005).
With a little examination, it is clear that our
everyday use of the word “hallucination”
entails a baseline for reference: we know
what it is like to not hallucinate, which
provides a point of comparison for when our
conscious experience includes items that
might not be there. It is, indeed, a natural step
to say that if all experience is synthesized,
then it is a hallucination, because the
implication is that there is no way to
corroborate that the synthesized contents of
experience really reflect anything external to
that experience. This is one of a number of
reasons why Kant (1787/1997, p. 112)
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correctly saw the need to distinguish contents
of perception from the underlying real things
that give rise to them, and it is also why, even
if stated more for shock value, Seth is correct
in characterizing the modern neuroscientific
view as a sort of hallucination. The difference
between the two characterizations is that the
neuroscientific view believes that the
contents of the mind conform to the objects
in the world, whereas objects conform to the
mind for Kant (Segall, 2019, p. 94)

then I have to question what in my
consciousness reflects what is outside while
also not taking for granted that there is an
outside. There are trees and also brains,
which is strangely self-contradictory. For it is
perceptual information about brains, through
an interpretative filter of what the brain does
(i.e., constructs experience), that first gives
rise to the thinking that one has no grounds to
believe that there is a brain to begin with. The
rationale follows a cycle that self-refutes as
follows:

If the modern neuroscientific view is that the
world that I have access to is constructed,

Figure 1: The hallucination narrative cycle.

A)
B)
C)
D)

Phenomenal experience naively indicates that there are brains.
Phenomenal experience indicates brain processes.
Brain processes are interpreted to construct experience.
The contents of experience cannot be verified to exist independent of synthesis, thus we
have no ground to affirm contents of A, and no real reason to think A is the case.

The neuroscientific interpretation implicitly
rests upon a strange assumption that naïve
realism is the case, and that whatever one
experiences must, by virtue of being
experienced, be real. This is strange in the
sense that philosophy has battered the view
from pillar to post, as one might see the
collective progression of philosophy and
science as a move away from naively
accepting the contents of experience, refining
the concepts of naïve experience,
reformulating metaphysics, and using these
to develop empirical methodological
research programs. The assumption, which is
very likely and completely outside the
conscious acknowledgement of scientists, is
particularly strange in its inclusion here

because as Seth (Seth and Raz, 2018) says,
experience
is
constructed
in
the
neuroscientific view. Experience cannot be
both a fabrication of internal processes and
the product of what is immediately drawn in
by the internal-external sensory interface of
the organism. Therefore, neuroscience seems
to implement a D* condition in the above
cycle, which states something along the lines
of “but while we can’t be sure that the first
order contents of A have a positive
ontological status, naïve realism affords these
contents ontological affirmation.” I see no
possible means of rational generosity that
would remove this contradiction. However,
matters get worse from here for modern
interpretation of the brain sciences.
3
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Quite possibly, the problem of cellular signal
transduction has gone completely unnoticed
in the philosophy of science and in the
empirical interpretation of neuroscience.
Signal transduction is the “transformation of
sensory stimulus energy into a cellular signal,
such as a receptor potential” (Bear et al.,
2016). Since one of the focuses of this article
is to challenge the tyranny of the eye, so to
speak, I will adduce phototransduction in
rods within the eye as the example. In fact,

cones work similarly, and the argument that
follows could just as easily have included
Merkel disks instead of photoreceptor cells.
The process of signal transduction can be
stated with varying levels of complexity, but
some of these details are cropped for
purposes of emphasizing salient features of
the process that are relevant to the present
discussion. The step-by-step process of
signal transduction in photoreceptor cells,
called rods, is as follows:

1. Electromagnetic waves incident upon the rhodopsin (photopigment).
2. Retinal in the opsin absorbs the electromagnetic energy.
3. The absorption means molecular changes in the retinal within the opsin, inducing
“activation.”
4. Transducin (the relevant G-protein) is stimulated.
5. Photodiesterase (PDE), the effector enzyme, is activated.
6. PDE activity reduces the cGMP level.
7. Na+ channels close and the cell is hyperpolarized (Bear et al., 2016, pp. 312-315)
From here, the signals pass through direct
and indirect pathways to the bipolar cells and
eventually into the central visual system.
While these physiological steps may not
seem to say much about the general theory of
neuroscience, I contend very much to the
contrary, as there is a tremendously important
disjunction present, as theorized by biology,
between the inner organism and that which is
external. The philosophical problem is that
what is outside of the organism is not what is
inside of the organism. The question I pose
is: How is it possible for cognitive processes
to take what is at the internal periphery of the
organism, and extract from the subsequent
concatenation of physical phenomena a
remotely accurate model of the external
world? Simply put in declarative form: what
is outside is not what is inside, and so the
neuroscientist cannot claim that the outside
world has anything to do with the inner
world. In fact, these internal signals are not
what is outside, so one arrives at a similar
complication as pointed out in figure 1.

Namely, that the eye is trusted in giving us
accurate information about the world, and
then the interpretation of those phenomenal
goings-on tell us that there is a schism that
undermines the flow of reliable information
into the organism. If the final upshot of all of
these processes, conscious experience,
cannot determine that there is a world behind
its veil of perception, then the experiencer is
not justified in claiming that there is an
external world.
The general conclusion of the above
arguments is that they are out of touch with
reality, and empirical science cannot pretend
to knowledge if it undermines the mode of
access it has to reality. The resolution
proposed later in this article when looking at
the PNS, will be to ground the interpretation
of neuroscience in a philosophical framework
that is realistic, and which affirms that the
organism is in touch with its environment
through philosophically realist means.
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The interpretive component in both of the
foregoing arguments against the modern
neuroscientific understandings – and we may
as well, with some reservation, include
contemporary biology – are problematic in
their mechanistic assumptions. The history of
physics includes a rarely cited problem, so
rarely cited that it doesn’t really have a proper
name, sometimes called the boundary
problem in mechanics, the contact problem,
or the argument against collisions. The key to
all of mechanical philosophy, as in the
Descartes’ philosophy (Gaukroger, 2010, p.
5), was that two disjoint things made of the
same substance, in this case matter, could
influence the motions of one another through
contact. The problem is really nothing more
than the simple quandary of how it is possible
for two objects, like to iron balls, to come into
contact. If one gives the question the
appropriate moment’s pause, it seems that
contact might occur at infinitesimal points,
but the issue with this is that the meaning of
infinitesimal points being in contact doesn’t
lend itself to sensible physical interpretation
(Hagar, 2014, pp. 14-19). At the instant of
first contact, it appears that mathematical
conceptions of accumulation points, after the
concepts of Real Analysis, does not make for
intelligible physical behavior.
For my part, I think the historical
commentary on mechanistic thinking is
almost fully laid out by Noam Chomsky in
his 1992 lecture in Spain, at the University of
Girona. In that lecture he said that the idea of
Cartesian dualism didn’t survive the century,
but many mistakenly think that the Cartesian
notion of mind or, as Ryle referred to it, the
notion of the “ghost” was done away with it.
Quite to the contrary, the problem of contact
in mechanistic philosophy was dealt with by
Newton, and it would be that Newton’s work
“exorcised” the machine, not the ghosts, but
that rather it would be ghosts all the way
down after that (Chomsky, 1992). I say

“almost” above, as the replacement of action
at a distance was partial, being that the
conception of gravity as distal agent of
influence was only a partial overturning of
problem of contact; and it would be, as
Chomsky says, ghosts all the way down, once
the idea of electrical fields would come into
their own. This is the reason that, historically,
the exorcism of the machine went unnoticed:
the exorcism was done piecemeal beginning
with the universal law of gravitation, and
then being completed with the works in
electrical fields and the general notion of the
atom as comprised of these fields. Chomsky
doesn’t mention the importance of these
latter notions in completing the exorcism, but
he does note that the exorcism was taken
somewhat more seriously later.
In fact, I would actually say that the
disjunction between science and philosophy
that grew out of the early 20th century where,
as Goldman (2006) notes, scientists
differentiated and separated themselves from
philosophers only to begin doing their own
philosophy without knowledge of proper
philosophical training, which ultimately
contributed to the strong reemergence of
mechanical philosophical assumptions. For
instance, advancements in science in the 17th
and 18th centuries looked far less
mechanistic,
where
Galvani
(Pera,
1986/1992, p. xix) argued for the existence of
“animal electricity” Driesch (1905/1914, p.
14) argued on behalf of a vitalism in biology,
and romantic thinker Hans Christian Ørsted
(Gillesberg, 2009, p. 27) discovered the
holistic nature of electricity and magnetism.
Therefore, the split between philosophy and
science resulted in scientists not knowing of
the exorcism and previous problems in
philosophy or the history of science. They
began taking up naïve realist views and,
perhaps, fully recommitted to mechanical
philosophy.
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That’s why contemporary discussion
ridiculing the ghost in the machine is
completely off track. In my opinion, it’s just
missing the point in what happened. What did
not survive is the theory of the machine –
contact mechanics was thrown out. I’m being
somewhat anachronistic when I say that the
17th
century
exorcised
mechanical
philosophy. It did, in principle, but it didn’t
yet do it, in fact. One consequence of
eliminating the machine is that we have
gotten rid of any notion of body, physical, or
material. There is no longer any notion of a
material world. Remember, Descartes could
be a dualist because he had a notion of body,
not a very clear notion, but at least a general
notion, given by the fact that a body is res
extensa, an extended sort of thing (Descartes,
1641/2017, p. 13), “Body” is defined by
mechanical
philosophy,
by
contact
mechanics, that’s body, as in the case of the
universal law of gravitation, as it requires
action at a distance. Now, Newton (Smith,
2007) showed that’s not the way a body
works; therefore, we have no conception of
body. In fact, there’s just the world, whatever
it is. Unless someone comes up with a new
notion of the physical, talking about
physicalism,
materialism,
eliminative
materialism, or the mind-body problem, is
meaningless. If you have no notion of
material, there can be no problem of reducing
things to the material; and there is no notion
of material (Chomsky, 1992). Chomsky
(1992) goes on to say that the entire field,
presumably the field of all cognitive and
brain sciences, is composed of discussion that
he says is not merely wrong but downright
meaningless. There may be no item more
crucial than this point about whether there
can be any such notion of “material” or
“mechanism” without contact, as every
initiate of neuroscience reads textbooks laden
with the words “mechanical,” “mechanism,”
and “matter.” For example, “ACh
(acetylcholine) and all the molecular

machinery associated with it are collectively
called the cholinergic system” (Bear et al.,
2016, p. 145). The training literature for these
brain-oriented disciplines is rife with these
references, which are meaningless.
This now serves as the segue into the primary
purpose of this article, which is to implement
a philosophical framework for neuroscience
to make sensible commentary on the nature
of consciousness. To do this I will explore
how the metaphysical and ontological aspects
of Whitehead’s speculative philosophy alters
the interpretive understanding of what the
brain does, and neuroscience, more
generally.
Enter the Philosophy of Organism
In the motivation, two preeminent points rise
above all others: a) the need for philosophical
realism to justify and certify that internal
states reflect the external world; b) to address
the exorcism of mechanistic philosophy and
the concept of matter. In purview of these
items needing correcting, it is not arbitrary
that an examination of Whitehead’s
philosophy has been called forth to rectify the
ailing scientific interpretation. Recent
developments in the philosophy of mind,
regarding the PNS, further supports the
choice of Whitehead’s philosophy, as will be
discussed shortly. Whitehead’s philosophy of
organism does away with substance, and it
provides a return to realism. Whitehead
achieves a return to realism by regarding all
bits of existence as being the same in their
type, as in each atomic bit being like others
in metaphysical kind, which we can refer to
for simplicity either as “actual occasions” or
“drops
of
experience”
(Whitehead,
1929/1985, p. 18). Within Whitehead’s
ontology, there is also very deliberate room
made for a pluralism of perspectives, such as
viewing the world as waves, which, like the
process metaphysics that allows for drops of
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experience to merge and concresce, one can
understand how waves might superimpose.
In the way that multiple waves can enter into
superposition in a given location, so can
actual occasions. Unlike waves, actual
occasions do not pass through one another
unaltered, but participate in a process of
becoming. This is the first insight.
The argument regarding cellular signal
transduction instantiates a divide between the
inside and outside of the organism, such that
what is outside and coming toward the
organism’s periphery must be considered
fundamentally different from what is
immediately inside the cellular boundary. In
other words, the only concept in common
between the outside of the organism and the
inside is energy, but that is the only
commonality. It is doubtful that a completely
disjoint inner world might be able to connect
meaningfully to the outer world in a way that
the information or experience on the different
sides of the boundary are somehow the same,
but in different forms. The signals outside are
thermally radiative, electromagnetic, or
mechanical waves, whereas the signals inside
are propagations of potential difference along
membranes of neurons.2 To reiterate, if not
entirely dismissed outright on the grounds of
the disjunction induced by signal
transduction. At the very least, the
neuroscientific view is left in a logically
2

Even in the plurality of ways in which one may look
at the movement of electrical qualities in the nervous
system, there is emphasis on the difference between
what is inside the organismic boundary and what is
outside. Whether one takes the view that the
propagation of action potential is the consequence of
ionic solutions vacillating and oscillating across
membranes of a single neuron or as if electrons were
flowing in direct-current-like conditions, both have
pragmatically acceptable claims to the reality of what
is happening (Allen, 2013). One need only consider
the Volta-Galvani debate to see the more primitive
version of this argumentation (see Marcello Pera’s
The Ambiguous Frog: The Galvani-Volta

inconsistent anti-realist position where it has
undermined the very features of perception
(i.e., seeing stuff going on in the brain) that
first gave rise to the scientific field’s
understanding. Understanding experience as
hallucinatory, in that experience is
constructed, seems to obviate the apparent
function of neural sensory pathways: of what
service is a set of sensory systems to an
organism if these pathways do not accurately
reflect what is outside of the organism? The
newly gained insight of Whitehead’s
philosophy of organism allows an
interpretive view that does away with this
problem entirely. That is, the “signals,” to be
crude, are of the same ontological type inside
the organism as they were outside, namely,
actual occasions. The many concrescing
contents of these complex, interdependent
drops of experience might mean that the
contents of experience, as they enter into the
organism, are not quite what they were
outside of the organism. But the type of
goings-on outside are the same inside, and
thus we have a fully satisfactory realism that
justifies that what is being experienced by the
organism is largely consistent with what is
going on outside of it. With some of the
preliminary points addressed, regarding how
the problems in the motivation will be
addressed with Whitehead’s sophisticated
and radical philosophy of organism, I need to
address advances in the philosophy of mind
Controversy on Animal Electricity) and reflect upon
this with the matured American Pragmatic thought of
Baas C. van Fraasen’s The Scientific Image. From
this, the various ways, as a collection, in which we
can look at what is happening inside of the organism
is certainly in no obvious way what is happening
outside of the organism; and from the
phenomenological vantage point, there is no
guarantee that what one is receiving on their
“television screen” is what is happening in front of
the “camera” or sensors, outside the organism.
However, thanks to Whitehead, we are not left to talk
of a noumenal realm, as Kant’s solution to the
problems of early modern philosophy led him.
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involving the PNS. Once that is complete, a
deeper discussion of a Whiteheadian
innervation (and invigoration) will be
possible.
The Growing Importance of
Peripheral Nervous System to
Philosophy of Mind

the
the

The Peripheral Mind by István Aranyosi
deserves a great deal of attention for its
powerful and original approach to
understanding consciousness. Aranyosi’s
approach is one that, if not fully grokked in
its subtleties, may be difficult to distinguish
from embodied mind. He frames his view
differently, so as to interpret “the mind as
truly distributed over the body… I would
rather call my approach ‘enminded body’
than ‘enbodied mind’” (Aranyosi, 2013, p.
xi). The impetus of Aranyosi’s thinking on
this subject derives from his personal
experiences of cancer treatment that caused
him to lose the use of his limbs, as if his mind
no longer extended to these peripheral
domains of his body – only later to regain
control, having them re-enminded, so to
speak. There is a certain sense that, upon
losing access to his limbs, Aranyosi’s
inner/outer boundary, or his subject/object
boundary, moved in such a way that his mind
lost ground: “The mind-world boundary
seems to have moved from the
skin/environment
junction
to
the
innervated/denervated junction within the
body. So, part of the body has become
external to the mind, or ‘deminded’”
(Aranyosi, 2013, p. 10). Interestingly, when
one typically thinks about the skin as being
the interface between the organism and the
environment, the idea of this boundary
moving fails to be a consideration. That is
one point that lends so much originality and
power to Aranyosi’s book.

In addition to the original contributions of the
book Aranyosi adduces, from across the
philosophy of mind literature, some
compelling points about the distributional
aspect of experiential states.
“[S]ensory states, like pain, are not
accounted for by a definite place in
the brain, but as a continuous
interaction among the peripheral
nerve fibers, the spinal cord, and
several areas of the brain. This means
that a neuroscientific account of these
states will involve large areas of both
the CNS and the PNS, and that the
state itself is therefore most naturally
understood as a distributional
property of the nervous system,
where what is distributed is electrical
activity” (Aranyosi, 2013, pp. 14-15).
There are two tacit thoughts feeding into this
on that Aranyosi (2013) is expressing. The
first is that neuroscience and its philosophical
interpreters appear to interpret very nearly
unanimously that there is no single location
where all of the neuronal signals or action
potentials are flowing. There isn’t a place
where “it all comes together” (Dennett, 1991,
p. 107). If there is no central control room or
experiencing room – Cartesian Theatre, as
Dennett puts it – where all of the individuated
signals combine and arrive as if to be
represented in a unified experience, then it is
unclear that there is another way to talk about
experience other than in a distributed sense.
“Distributed sense,” rather than a localized
place where “it all comes together,” suggests
that experience is smeared out across, at least,
the central nervous system (CNS). That begs
the question of what is different about the
neurons in CNS and PNS? If philosophers of
mind and neuroscience, or the neuroscientists
themselves, can’t distinguish the neurons
then the periphery of the body, as with the
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PNS, deserves some focus and mention when
it comes to where experience is.
The second tacit thought is the peculiarity in
the philosophy of mind literature in
discussing c-fibers as being identical to pain,
in that c-fiber firing is what pain is. Authors,
beginning with Puccetti (1977), have pointed
out that c-fibers are not themselves a part of
either the dorsal column-medial lemniscus
pathway or the lateral corticospinal tract. In
other words, “they do not themselves project
any higher [than the receptor cells on the
spinal cord], and thus are not brain states
when stimulated” (Puccetti, 1977, p. 303).
The peculiarity is that philosophers have
placed so much stock in a Cartesian way of
thinking, in which the mind is housed by the
cranial cavity, and yet one of the first
opportunities philosophers take to discuss
how the biological “wires” and “hardware”
are the mental states results in a faux pas of
placing the mental state outside of the brain.
While this is a peculiarity on the part of
identity theorists and adherents of
functionalism, Aranyosi doesn’t take this
move as a true faux pas: “[T]he real irony is
that… they were basically right [that] pain is
C fiber firing and anything else that involves
the PNS’s activity within pain states! They
were right for the wrong reasons” (Aranyosi,
2013, p. 41). The intuition of placing mental
states beyond the skull, though not the
intention of philosophers of mind, coincides
well with the thinking that experience is
distributed. With no reason to limit the
distribution to CNS, the PNS can be taken as
also possessing mental states. The
emendation I will make is that the PNS and
the entire nervous system channels
experience, acting as a conduit for
experiences in a Whiteheadian metaphysical
framework.
As much as The Peripheral Mind is a boon
for the views taken in this paper, there is

arguably even more support for a
Whiteheadian understanding of the PNS from
the shortcomings of Aranyosi’s book. While
taking a much more empirical approach,
noting relevant, well-known facts of
neuroscience, the book lacks some amount of
substance in that it doesn’t answer basic
questions about the conclusions drawn
throughout. One such issue that I would like
to address is when Aranyosi says, “The fiber
can be considered conscious in the sense of
its activity being constitutive of a conscious
state, say, a sensory state. What ‘conscious’
means at that level is, of course, nothing but
being active or firing in a certain way, the
way depending on what global conscious
state it is a part of” (Aranyosi, 2013, p. 50).
Problematic is why firing and being active
takes the fiber from an unconscious state to a
conscious state. The direction of the book is
noble and, I think, right-headed, as it
accounts for empirical, analytic, and
phenomenological considerations; however,
I perceive the weakness in the cited stretch of
text is a problem of metaphysics. The
Peripheral Mind Hypothesis (PMH), as he
calls it, is not sufficiently undergirded with a
metaphysical
framework.
Such
a
metaphysical
framework
should
satisfactorily answer ontological questions,
such as why a fiber is conscious when it is
active and not when it isn’t. The apparently
arbitrary claims don’t stop there. A logical
extension of the privileged status of firing
nerve fibers is that Aranyosi sets the
neuromuscular junctions (NMJs) as sites that
separate what can be conscious from what is
never conscious, (i.e., muscle and whatever
else is on the NMJ that is not, itself, part of
the PNS). From this, one should detect that
Aranyosi avoids moving into the realm of
panpsychism by arbitrarily capping his
arguments prematurely with stipulations.
Drawn to their conclusion, the arguments
could go a few different ways, depending on
the metaphysics one takes up. For instance,
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one might say that the nerve fibers, in a way,
take on a constitutive role in consciousness
whenever they fire, because there is already a
property in their raw “material” nature,
namely, a mind-like or mind-constituting
property, as in some varieties of substance
neutral monism (Stubenberg, 2016).
The transition in discussion to a proverbial
Whiteheadian innervation can be made by
noting, specifically, what Aranyosi’s struggle
seems to be. As a project, The Peripheral
Mind (Aranyosi, 2013) seems to rest upon the
naive
materialistic
metaphysics
of
neuroscience, which, as discussed in the
motivation for this paper, is not a tenable
assumption or set of assumptions. More
broadly, the materialistic line of thought is
probably a major contributing factor for
categories difficulties in philosophy of
science, such as those generated by the notion
of natural kinds. In fact, that can be seen in
The Peripheral Mind, where the author never
discusses the content of the nervous system at
a level lower than that of “fibers” or “wires.”
Thinking about the nervous system in terms
exclusively for the sake of excitatory postsynaptic potentials and inhibitory postsynaptic potentials raises the individual
neuron to a privileged status without
considering the roles and relevance of
intercellular and extracellular fluids – the
soup of cations and anions (K+, Na+, Cl-, and
Ca2+) with charged gradients qua “societies
of electronic occasions,” as Whitehead would
say (Whitehead, 1929/1985, p. 91). This
thinking also fails to consider the
consciousness/unconsciousness status of
glial cells or components comprising the
neuron itself. Are voltage-gated ions and
metabotropic receptors conscious? What
about when the fiber, the neuron, is
undergoing an action potential? If one
considers the physical process occurring
during depolarization and the firing of the
action potential, there actually is no one state

that is the “firing” of the neuron, but it is,
instead, the series of events. It is far easier
and more natural to think about the flows of
ions across membranes and the movement of
electric potential in the neuron, all, as flows
and events. For this reason and more, I think
the best answer to the above-asked questions
is to formulate the answers in a way that
makes consciousness a constitutive property
of the world, and to make the focus of the
discussion events, not objects or things in a
piecemeal, disconnected sense. Whitehead’s
metaphysics is supremely suited for this task.
The consequences of applying Whitehead’s
process metaphysics and ontology to the
understanding of the human organism are in
stark contrast to attempts to understand the
human organism from within a materialist
framework. Neuroscience extends its
machine-speak by extending the use of
language to axons, referring to them as wires
in many cases, but almost invariably referring
to them in such a way as to imply that they
are carrying signals, integrating signals in
excitatory and inhibitory ways, and even
processing signals in ways that are similar to
binary computational processes (Churchland,
1986, pp. 210-211; Bear et al., 2016, pp. 132140). The conditional assumption that gives
rise to this perspective is one that supports the
tyranny of the eye: if it can be seen, it is real,
and if it cannot be detected by the eye, it is
not real. In other words, the eye has
exhaustive access to reality, whether that
means direct or indirect access. This
conditional assumption is peculiar for its
radical
contradiction
with
Seth’s
hallucination characterization and the
problematic nature of signal transduction
(Raven et al., 2005/2014, p. 168). One might
restate the conditional assumption with
maximal irony, in the following sort of way:
hallucinations exhaustively indicate what
exists and what does not. If drawn out to its
fullest logical extent, a self-referential truth
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paradox will arise. The speculative process
philosophy, in connecting the inside and
outside of the organism, making the
periphery of the organism no boundary at all,
leaves room for interpretations as to how one
should think about what’s going on, if an
organism is not merely an electro-chemical
soup with signals floating around in it. The
interpretation I offer here is one that moves
away from the hubris of the tyranny of the
eye, to a humbler conception, specifically, a
conception that admits that we cannot see all
of what is going on in the nervous system.
The intent here is not to deny what we see in
neurophysiology. That there are things
appearing as signal transmission between
neurons with propagations down axons,
seems beyond doubt. However, rather than
electrons carrying information down a wire,
it is more sensible to think of these visible
phenomena as tracers for what is happening.
The reasoning behind thinking these action
potentials – or even the recognized smaller
contents of cells, such as the cations, anions,
and alpha helix components of ion channels
– are merely tracers is that Whitehead tells us
that actual occasions are not fully analyzable,
but that they can be analyzed in parts through
modes. “The philosophy of organism is a
cell-theory of actuality. Each ultimate unit of
fact is a cell-complex, not analysable into
components with equivalent completeness of
actuality” (Whitehead, 1929/1986, p. 219).
Therefore, I propose that the way one views
the influx of data from the nervous system be
such that the flows of information be seen as
flows of experience. On that score, the PNS
and CNS can be thought of as a conduit of
channels that directs experience around
various pathways. Even this explication is not
correct in the fullest sense. The view is still a
bit materialistic and mechanical, thinking of
experience as a fluid moving a round pipes.
Just as the electromagnetic field “leaks” out
of the pipe, that is the wire, so, too, we should

consider the nervous systems as guides for
drops of experience, but that not all of which
remain on the beaten path. With this caveat in
mind for qualification of my subsequent
manner of speaking, we can briefly discuss
the role of the brain.
The swirlings of experience along the paths
of the neuron somas and down the axons,
across the synapses of the PNS, CNS, and the
brain can only be clearly understood if one
takes the view that the point of the flows is to
gain a unified large-scale consciousness
within the organism. Due to the complexity
and nuances of the interchange of processes
in the PNS with what happens in the brain, it
is beyond the scope of this article to discuss
the brain’s role, specifically. More relevant is
the role of negative prehensions at the
peripheries of the organism, which will
ultimately serve as a prelude to what the brain
is and does. Of central importance, however,
one should take stock of the fact that the type
of content giving rise to each region of the
body, in terms of giving rise to the structure
and state of the body in time, is the same.
That is, the PNS draws in actual occasions,
and all of what we characterize as the
contents of the cranium are, likewise, an
ensemble of actual occasions. While actual
occasions qualitatively differ in the PNS and
brain, ontologically speaking, they are
metaphysically the same type of thing; just as
oxygen and nitrogen, in the materialist
metaphysics, are of the same type (i.e.,
matter), while differing in ontological
quality.
If we look at the human body, as well as
organisms from earlier ancestral lines that are
still extant, there is some indication that
neurophysiology at the periphery is quite
different, especially in terms of sense organs,
and it is even clear that organismic to various
forms of sense data arose in succession. For
instance, the sudden wide-ranging eruption
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of vision, as a mode of perception, in the
Cambrian explosion was a significant event
in the organismic evolutionary trajectory
(Trestman, 2013). I argue that we can
understand this more readily in the realist
terms of Whitehead’s conception of negative
prehensions in the PNS and the specialized
sensory pathways. Taking philosophical
realism seriously, in simpler lifeforms, one
would not expect an organism to draw in a
complex holism of experience through its
periphery, (i.e., organismic boundary) and
utilize it comprehensively to perceive the
environment. Rather, one would expect
simpler data influx, which then could be used
in a simplistic way to maintain its survival
and successfully procreate. In Whitehead’s
categoreal scheme, chapter two of Process
and Reality, it includes a conception that
describes what happens not only in any sense
organ, but what can occur in any actual
occasion: negative prehension – an
elimination of feeling, which “holds its
datum as inoperative in the progressive
concrescence of prehensions constituting the
unity of the subject (Whitehead, 1929/1986,
pp. 23-24). Instead of viewing nociceptors,
for example, as engaging in signal
transduction resulting in pain signals from
the domain of the skin, one can eliminate
logical contradictions by viewing this process
as entailing negative prehensions: with an
overwhelming totality of feeling existing on
the outer boundary of the organism, negative
prehensions permit in a limited amount of
what is available in the incoming drops of
experience. Rather than the inundation of an
infinitude, negative prehension allows for a
simpler, more manageable influx of feeling.
On this view, that simpler organisms are even
without brains should not be very surprising.
If what an organism is doing is channeling
inward a small qualitative swathe of what is
available in the environment, then more
complex organisms, possessing more
varieties of sensory experience, would need a

means to swirl around the “routes of
experience,” whereby nerves serve as
swirling paths to mix and combine
experience. In fact, this is a remixing of what
is already present in the external world, just
beyond the horizon of the organism. Here, we
arrive at a radically new evolutionary
purpose for what the brain does in giving rise
to consciousness. However special the brain
is in the human body, for example, it is not
quite as unique as the uninitiated might think.
Let us look deeper into the PNS.
The enteric division (which I will refer to as
“ENS” for enteric nervous system) of the
autonomic nervous system (ANS), a division
of the PNS, has two parts: the myenteric and
submucous plexuses. They serve as the lining
and source of innervation of the esophagus,
stomach, intestines, pancreas, and gall
bladder. This division is often referred to as
the “little brain” by the mechanisticallyminded neuroscientists (Bear et al., 2016, p.
535). Referring to this portion of the ANS as
a brain used to be only due to the great
independence with which it operates and the
hundred million plus neurons contained
therein. This observation turns out to have a
deeper connection to the human evolutionary
history. Researchers in the field of
neuroscience have found compelling
evidence to suggest that not only was the
ENS probably in existence prior to the
development of the cranially encased brain,
which may have found its first neurons stem
from what is now the colon, but the global
operation of earlier evolutionary ancestors,
for whatever global direction there was
within the organism, seems to have been
handled by the organism’s gut (Furness and
Stebbing, 2017; Spencer et al., 2018). Two
decades before these researches elevated the
status of the ENS, Michael D. Gershon, M.D.
had taken up the thesis seriously, as his
interest in the neurotransmitter 5HT/serotonin, led him to focus on the gut, the
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producer of over 95 % of the body’s serotonin
(Gershon, 1999, p. xii). While Gershon’s
work largely figures into the treatment of
disease, directly, such as in addressing the
poltergeist-like bowel and gut diseases, there
is tremendous philosophical value in
considering the ENS as a second brain that
has self-managing functions and which takes
on moods, emotional dispositions, and which
may even be said to have instincts all its
own.3
What this gut-as-brain thinking does
philosophically is challenge any left-over
Cartesian thinking remaining in neuroscience
and philosophy of mind. To Chalmer’s and
Clark’s (2012) thinking that cognition “ain’t
all in the head,” these neuroscientific
researchers affirm the folk psychology of
18th and 19th centuries as if to say: yes, we
knew this all along, but the knowledge of the
feelings in our guts were persuaded by the
reasons in our skulls (p. 1). By leaning their
thought heavily upon phenomenology, Clark
and Chalmers have generated and developed
the conception of an extended mind, but the
idea of embodied knowledge is not widely
accepted among philosophers, and it isn’t
even accepted by Aranyosi in his philosophy
on the PNS. The natural inclination to reject
thinking about the ENS as a brain, even
though it may have been the executive before
there was one housed in a skull, is that one
might find it difficult to accept that the gut
has knowledge. In Part III, “Mind Embodied”
3

I’ll leave it for a future endeavor to examine the
literature of feelings in relation to the gut – an idea
that has fallen out of favor in the 20th century.
Sufficient for this discussion is that there is an
empirical and evolutionary reason for thinking this
way, as well as a pragmatic reason, in that this way of
thinking yields to medical application and a
methodological research program for further inquiry.
However, the reader’s mind should, tout de suite, go
back to the 18th and 19th century, when dispositional
and emotional sense were lent to the gut; and to the
history of philosophical thought, which afforded

in The Peripheral Mind, Aranyosi resists
many of the conclusions argued for by
embodied minded, despite the fact that he’s
presenting a kind of “enminded body”
approach; and one of these conclusions he
dismisses is knowledge in the PNS.
Aranyosi’s mantra seems to be that all
aspects of cognition are constitutive in the
presence of some higher order manifestation:
PNS firing, for example, is constitutive of a
global awareness. Thus, I think he would say
that a nerve cell firing is conscious in the
body, in concert with those other constitutive
firings, though not in vitro. The problem
appears to be one of method. Analyticallyminded philosophy views the world as
building upwards from parts, and so this is a
preeminent feature of Aranyosi’s thought. It
precludes the gut from having knowledge,
primarily, because there isn’t a sensible way
to discuss abstract knowledge in the ENS –
not that there is one for the cerebral cortex!
The aspect of construction in Aranyosi’s
PMH is clear when one appreciates that he
views the sense organs and PNS as one would
roots of a tree, and where the roots draw in
water the sense organs and PNS play a
necessary and unique role in how the
organism experiences the world.4 “[A]
precise recreation of the experience of the
external world will have to involve the
peripheral reconstruction of a body, with all
its relevant components, not only neural but
hormonal and anatomical” (Aranyosi, 2013,
p. 24). This thinking shines with brilliance as
deeper significance to the quality of digestion as it
relates to the whole person.
4
I admit the shortcoming of this analogy in a number
of respects. What tree roots draw in are the same as
what is within the tree roots; and this is
Whiteheadian, not what Aranyosi wants to say. As an
aside, the tree root is an excellent representation of
the nervous system as a Whiteheadian “nervous
system ecology,” similar to what Allan Combs
(2011) communicates through a Lynn Margulis quote
about the true nature of nerves in Ch. 3 of The
Radiance of Being.
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Aranyosi meets the question of, “What is it
like to be a bat?,” with, “What is it like to be
this bat versus that bat?” The philosophy
developed is laudable, but the shortcoming in
this is that it leaves no room for the gut to
possess
knowledge.5
Whitehead’s
philosophy of organism allows for the
“constitutive” element that Aranyosi’s PMH
explicitly needs, without committing to any
notion of a constructed experience. This is
made possible through concrescence,
prehension (especially, the idea of negative
prehension), and the specific metaphysical
makeup of the world, namely, actual
occasions. This framework replaces our
modern mechanical materialistic view of
what happens at the organism’s boundary, so
as to draw in the drops of experience, the
actual occasions. All cells – each being
societies of actual occasions – in various
ways, will serve as portals or inward flows of
experience through prehension. Philosophers
and scientists tend to think of the sensory
organ pathways (e.g., the auditory pathway)
as carrying the only elements of experience,
but with the shift to Whitehead’s philosophy,
drops of experience are prehended along the
entire outer manifold and envelop of the
organism. The focus by philosophers and
scientists on sense organs is entirely because
of the relatively systematic fashion in which
these pathways can access information, but
the benefit and stability of drawing in a
limited swathe of experience to be analyzed
systematically comes at the cost of negative
prehension. These pathways cut out some
experience, allowing in more uniformly
mode-specific varieties of what we

commonly mean by “sense experience” –
each pathway drawing in its own specific
feeling (e.g., aspects of vision). To put it
squarely for the newcomer to Whitehead’s
philosophy, “With the purpose of obtaining a
one-substance cosmology, ‘prehensions’ are
a generalization from Descartes’ mental
‘cogitations,’ and from Locke’s ‘ideas,’ to
express the most concrete mode of analysis
applicable to every grade of individual
actuality” (Whitehead, 1929/1985, p. 19).6
Organisms are finite beings, and so the
capacity to make sense of the whole drops of
experience not entering through the sense
organs, usually go without much conscious
awareness; however, sometimes they
mysteriously rise to the point of salient
consciousness
even
if
not
fully
understandable. For the parts of the sensory
world that we have come to know from the
supposed “five senses” we tend to give all the
credit, but one should not cede to the tyranny
of the eye, so to speak, assuming that the
finite sense modalities of our human
experience is exhaustive. Whitehead’s
speculative philosophy suggests it is not
exhaustive. Moreover, there is a seeming
endless run of documented experience
through various intellectual disciplines or in
personal accounts wherein the experiences
are mystical, whether that means they are not
reproducible or are inexplicable in terms of
our common modes of sense. The history of
literature is peppered with unusual human
experiences that are consistent with
experience that is not derived from sense
organs.7 One example comes in a passage of
Joseph Conrad’s The Heart of Darkness:

5

extended and read, whereas the cube inside the
organism’s boundary is neither actually red nor
actually a cube (James, p. 487). There is no extended,
red-colored thing inside the organism’s boundary,
though it is red and extended in the mind.
7
Whitehead’s lingo does cover this conception
formally with the terminology of “presentational
immediacy” (Whitehead, 1929/1985, p. 121). I have
consciously pulled back a bit on the Whiteheadian

It is worth taking the moment to remind ourselves
that the framework in which experience is
constructed fails, and this was addressed as one of the
motivations of this paper in the opening salvo.
6
I include this particular bit, as it shows the
metaphysical solution to the question posed by
William James regarding how things outside of the
organism might pass into the organism, considering,
for example, a red cube outside of the organism is
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“The fact is I was completely
unnerved by a sheer blank fright, pure
abstract terror, unconnected with any
distinct shape of physical danger.
What made this emotion so
overpowering was – how shall I
define it? – the moral shock I
received, as if something altogether
monstrous, intolerable to thought and
odious to the soul, had been thrust
upon me unexpectedly. This lasted of
course the merest fraction of a
second…” (Conrad, 1902, pp. 107108)
The experience was not anchored in sensory
modalities, which is why it was a “blank
fright” and a “pure abstract terror.”8 Within
the ambit of Whitehead’s philosophy, the
experience is quite intelligible, since one can
have experiences that are not so directly
contingent upon the data coming in from
sense organs. Another example is Mrs.
Gradgrind in Dicken’s Hard Times, when
Mrs. Gradgrind experiences a pain that is in
the room (Dickens, 1854/2001).
Revisiting the ENS with a mind toward
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, the
idea of gut feelings and experiences,
especially somatic experiences, that do not
seem to hinge on sensory organ input. Instead
of electrical signals pulsing around the body,
we can think in terms of the feelings or drops
of experience (or actual occasions) swirling
about the organism, mostly, but not
exclusively, in the PNS – and the PNS is a
vocabulary, seeking a “middle way,” choosing to
employ only those bits of verbiage that are
unavoidable for the discussions of the philosophy of
organism in this paper.
8
To reduce the concern that we are merely speaking
from a vapid point of fiction, Whitehead provides
more concrete experiences that are not grounded in
presentational immediacy. One example of particular
power is causation or causal connection, which one

series of conduits and canals channeling
drops of experience, ushering them to other
parts of the organism. In so thinking, we
arrive back at a common understanding of
how experiences or feelings are processed “in
the gut,” such as in Nietzsche’s reference to
this in his On the Genealogy of Morals: “If
someone cannot cope with his ‘psychic
sufferings,’ this does not stem from his
psyche, to speak crudely; more probably
from his stomach…A strong and well-formed
man digests his experiences (including deeds
and misdeeds) as he digests his meals, even
when he has hard lumps to swallow”
(Nietzsche, 1887/2013, p. 95). The common
experience of gut feelings, whether about
immediate dangers or the experiences of love
or in moral consideration, lends to the
decentralization of cognition leading it away
from the throne of its former glory, spreading
it around the body more democratically.
Concluding Remarks
The problems for philosophy of mind and
neuroscience presented here, namely, the
problem of signal transduction and the
problem of where to go after the exorcism of
mechanistic philosophy, I have suggested a
resolution through by implementing
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. While
the current scientific take, viewing the
nervous system as merely electrical in nature,
Whitehead’s
metaphysical
view
of
“substance” is one that dismisses with the
mechanistic, materialistic world. It opts for a
world of events, drops of experience, which
can combine in the constitutive fashion that
might either deny like Hume, as it seemed to be a
kind of “pure abstract terror” to Hume. The point is
that not all of what exists in our world is given in
presentational immediacy, despite there being very
strong evidence for it. And the evidence of feelings
that arise, not appended to sense organ data, are
indicative of things in the world as shown in fictional
literature.
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Aranyosi (2013) discusses. This also
eliminates
the
problem
of
signal
transduction, because the kind of thing on the
outside of the organism is the kind of thing
that exists on the inside of the organismic
boundary: actual occasions/drops of
experience/feelings. The analyzed content of
each incoming actual occasion may be
different and sense organs of an organism
may draw in a specific type of feeling through
negative prehension, but it remains the case
that these modes are drawing from the same
kind of ontological and metaphysical entity,

actual occasions, which we do just as well to
think of as drops of experience. The process
and reality of the nervous system, then, is one
of actual occasions producing a swirling buzz
along the neuronal conduits. The body is
furnished throughout with experience,
provided by the rise of new actual occasions
from other constantly concrescing and
satisfying occasions. In this Whiteheadian
innervation, the living organism is brought to
life with the satisfaction of feeling, which is
situated in a realist ontology devoid of
debilitating internal inconsistencies.

References
Allen, C. (2013). The geometry of partial understanding. American Philosophical Quarterly,
249-262. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/24475347?seq=1 [login required]
Aranyosi, I. (2013). The peripheral mind: philosophy of mind and the peripheral nervous
system. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Bear, M. F., Connors, B. W., & Paradisio, M. A. (1996/2016). Neuroscience: Exploring the
brain (4th ed.). Philadelphia, PA: Wolters Kluwer.
Chomsky, N. (1992). The cognitive revolution [Video]. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S3gFaNYluBQ
Churchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of the mind-brain.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (2012). The extended mind. In R. Menary (Ed.), The extended mind
(pp. 1-13). New York, NY: Bradford Books.
Combs, A. (2011). The radiance of being: Understanding the grand integral vision;
living the integral life. St. Paul, MN: Paragon House.
Conrad, J. (1902). The heart of darkness. Retrieved from
https://www.planetebook.com/free-ebooks/heart-of-darkness.pdf
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. New York, NY: Back Bay Books.
Descartes, R. (2017). Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, in qua Dei existentia et animæ
immortalitas demonstratur (J. Veitch, Trans.). Meditations on First Philosophy (Open
Classics). Toronto, Canada: Our Open Media. Retrieved September 21, 2018, from

16
https://digitalcommons.ciis.edu/cejournal/vol16/iss1/8

16

Milliern: A Whiteheadian Innervation of the Soma: A New Vision for the

Journal of Conscious Evolution| Fall 2020 | Vol. 16 (1) | David Millierrn - A Whiteheadian
Innervation of the Soma

https://bradleymurray.ca/texts/rene-descartes-meditations-on-first-philosophy-pdfouropenmedia.pdf
Dickens, C. (2001). Hard times. New York, NY: Dover Thrift Editions. (Original work
published 1854)
Driesch, H. (1905/1914). Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und als Lehre (C. K. Ogden,
Trans.). The History and Theory of Vitalism. London, England: MacMillan & Co.
Furness, J. B., & Stebbing, M. J. (2017). The first brain: Species comparisons and
evolutionary implications for the enteric and central nervous systems.
Neurogastroenterology and Motility, 30(2), e13234. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1111/nmo.13234
Gaukroger, S. (2010). The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility: Science and the
Shaping of Modernity 1680-1760. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Gershon, M. (1999). The second brain: A groundbreaking new understanding of nervous
disorders of the stomach and intestine. New York, NY: Harper Perennial.
Gillesberg, T. (2009). A Lesson for Copenhagen Today: Hans Christian Ørsted's Scientific
Method. 21st Century Science and Technology, 22-33.
Goldman, S. L. (2006). Lecture 13: Scientific truth in the early 20th century [Video]. In
Science wars: What scientists know and how they know it. Chantilly, VA: The Teaching
Company.
Hagar, A. (2014). Discrete or Continuous?: The quest for fundamental length in modern
physics (pp. 13-19). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
James, W. (1904). Does 'consciousness' exist? The Journal of Philosophy,
Psychology and Scientific Method, 1(18), 477-491. doi:10.2307/2011942
Kant, I. (1787/1997). Kritique der reinen Vernunft (P. Guyer & A. Wood, Trans.). Critique of
Pure Reason. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Nietzsche, F. (2013). Zur genealogie der moral: Eine streitschrift [On the genealogy of morals],
(C. Diethe, Trans.), (K. Ansell-Pearson, Ed). New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press. (Original work published 1887)
Pera, M. (1986/1992). La controversia sull'eletricità tra Galvana e Volta (J. Mandelbaum,
Trans.). The Ambiguous Frog: The Galvani-Volta Controversy on Animal Electricity.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Puccetti, R. C. (1991). The great c-fiber myth: A critical note. Philosophy of Science,
44(2), 303-305. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/187355?seq=1 [login

17
Published by Digital Commons @ CIIS, 2020

17

Journal of Conscious Evolution, Vol. 16 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 8

Journal of Conscious Evolution| Fall 2020 | Vol. 16 (1) | David Millierrn - A Whiteheadian
Innervation of the Soma

required]
Raven, P. H., Johnson, G. B., Mason, K. A., Losos, J. B., & Singer, S. R.
(2005/2014). Biology (10th ed., pp. 168-185). New York, NY: McGraw Hill.
Rosenberg, J. F. (2005). Accessing Kant: A relaxed introduction to the critique of pure
reason (pp. 113-160). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Segall, M. T. (2019). Why German idealism matters. The Side View, 1(1), 92-101.
Seth, A. K., & Raz, G. (2018, October 5). Anil Seth: How does your brain construct your
conscious reality? [Radio broadcast transcript]. National Public Radio. Retrieved from
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/654730916
Smith, G. (2007, December 20). Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica.
In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved September 15, 2019, from
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton-principia/
Spencer, N. J., Hibberd, T. J., Travis, L., Winklendt, L., Costa, M., Zu, H., & Sorensen, J.
(2018). Identification of a rhythmic firing pattern in the enteric nervous system that
generates rhythmic electrical activity in smooth muscle. The Journal of Neuroscience,
38(24), 5507-5522. doi: https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3489-17.2018
Stang, N. F. (2016). Kant’s transcendental idealism. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendentalidealism/#AppeThinThem
Stubenberg, L. (2016). Neutral monism. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved
from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/
Trestman, M. (2013). The Cambrian Explosion and the origins of embodied
cognition. Biological Theory, 8, 80-92. Retrieved from
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13752-013-0102-6
Whitehead, A. (1985). Process and reality (D. Griffin & D. Sherburne (Eds.). New York, NY:
The Free Press. (Original work published 1929)

18
https://digitalcommons.ciis.edu/cejournal/vol16/iss1/8

18

